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BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS: THE SUPREME COURT’S “NEW” TAKE 
ON INVOCATION AND WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT 
INTRODUCTION 
“You have the right to remain silent.  Anything you say can and will be 
used against you in a court of law.”  Anyone who has ever watched an episode 
of Law and Order has inevitably heard an actor, posing as a police officer, 
rattle off this phrase while handcuffing a suspect.  Unfortunately, few viewers 
likely stop and think about the meaning of this phrase, and even fewer 
appreciate the constitutional protections supposedly guarded by Miranda 
warnings such as this.  It should come as no surprise that many American 
citizens do not know how to utilize the two fundamental protections, the right 
to remain silent and the right to counsel, outlined by the Supreme Court in 
Miranda v. Arizona.1  Many suspects taken into custody will either 
unknowingly waive one or both of these rights or ineffectively attempt to 
invoke them, resulting in incriminating statements being admitted against them 
later in court.  The Supreme Court recently added to the jurisprudential 
confusion with its decision in Berghuis v. Thompkins.2 
In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the majority, consisting of five Justices, held 
that a suspect who wishes to invoke his right to remain silent must do so 
unambiguously and failure to do so may result in an implied waiver of that 
right.3  With respect to the facts of the case, the Court found that the defendant, 
Thompkins, failed to invoke his right to remain silent by remaining almost 
entirely silent during two hours and forty-five minutes of interrogation, and 
thus his three affirmative responses to questions near the end of that 
interrogation were admitted against him at trial.4  The Court further found that 
Thompkins’ failure to effectively invoke this right coupled with his responses 
to the three questions after an extended period of time amounted to a waiver of 
his right to remain silent.5  Justice Sotomayor, joined by three other Justices, 
wrote a compelling dissenting opinion, attacking the majority’s opinion for 
 
 1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 2. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
 3. Id. at 2264. 
 4. Id. at 2256–57. 
 5. Id. at 2262–63. 
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reducing the Miranda burden with respect to the waiver issue and 
inappropriately reaching the invocation issue altogether.6 
This Note evaluates the merits of the Berghuis v. Thompkins majority and 
dissenting opinions, the impact of these principles on Miranda jurisprudence, 
and the practical repercussions of this opinion for both courts and law 
enforcement officials.  The first section of this Note looks at the history behind 
Miranda protections, including pre-Miranda protections for suspects in 
custody, Miranda v. Arizona itself, and courts’ interpretations of Miranda in 
the years following the landmark decision.  The second section looks at the 
Berghuis v. Thompkins decision, evaluating and comparing the majority and 
dissenting opinions.  The third and final section of this Note analyzes the 
substance of the Thompkins decision, addressing concerns with the law applied 
by the majority, the Supreme Court’s deviation from Miranda’s originally 
strong protections, and the outlook for the future of the standard outlined in 
Thompkins. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF THE MIRANDA FRAMEWORK 
From its earliest cases dealing with suspects’ rights, the Supreme Court has 
relied on various constitutional amendments, rules, and policies to exclude 
inappropriately obtained statements and regulated their admission with a 
variety of standards and tests.  As a result, Miranda jurisprudence has become 
somewhat convoluted.  An understanding of this history, however, is necessary 
for a full appreciation of the actual impact of cases like Berghuis v. Thompkins.  
For this reason, this Note begins with a discussion of that history. 
A. Origin of Miranda Rights 
1. Earliest Protections for Suspects 
In one of the earliest cases regarding confessions used to obtain 
convictions, the Supreme Court, relying nearly completely on common law 
principles, determined confessions obtained through coercion were 
inadmissible as unreliable against that suspect.7  Over a decade later, the Court 
switched from a “reliability” standard and instead relied on the Fifth 
Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination to bar the admission of 
improperly obtained and involuntary statements of suspects in custody.8  The 
 
 6. Id. at 2266 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[The majority’s] propositions mark a substantial 
retreat from the protection against compelled self-incrimination that Miranda v. Arizona has long 
provided during custodial interrogation.” (citation omitted)). 
 7. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 585 (1884). 
 8. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543 (1897).  Although the reasoning is very similar 
to the analysis employed in Miranda v. Arizona, in the period after Bram and up until the actual 
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Supreme Court then again switched gears in 1936 and turned to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause to exclude statements induced through 
coercion.9  The Court began to apply a totality of the circumstances approach 
to determine if a statement was freely given,10 but it continually struggled to 
define the exact circumstantial factors that affected the voluntariness of the 
defendant’s statement.11  Some contextual features included personal 
characteristics of the defendant, whether or not the accused had been warned of 
his right to remain silent and obtain legal counsel, as well as physical and 
psychological pressures.12 
The Supreme Court continued to grapple with this extremely flexible 
analysis, and this struggle became very obvious in Spano v. New York.13  In 
that case, the defendant was questioned by numerous officers over a period of 
eight hours, and his requests to speak with his retained counsel were repeatedly 
denied.14  The Court reversed his conviction after a discussion of the 
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s confession.15  Ultimately, it was the 
concurring opinion of Justice Douglas that highlighted concerns that the 
suspect was denied access to counsel while in custody.16  Joined by Justices 
Black and Brennan, the three reiterated distress that “[d]epriving a person, 
formally charged with a crime, of counsel during the period prior to trial may 
be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself.”17  In a 
separate concurrence, also joined by Justices Black and Brennan, Justice 
Stewart articulated that the denial of counsel alone was enough to render the 
confession inadmissible.18  Spano dealt with due process issues because, in that 
case, the defendant had been formally charged at the time he made the 
 
Miranda decision, the Supreme Court rarely relied on the Fifth Amendment as grounds for 
excluding statements made by suspects while in custody.  See discussion infra notes 9–24. 
 9. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) (finding that statements made by 
suspects after prolonged periods of physical torture were inadmissible). 
 10. E.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352, U.S. 192, 197 (1957); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 
567 (1958). 
 11. See Culombe v. Conneticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604–05 (1961) (plurality opinion) (“The 
notion of ‘voluntariness’ is itself an amphibian.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960) (considering defendant’s 
mental stability and possible insanity); Payne, 356 U.S. at 564 (considering defendant’s education 
level and food deprivation); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 52–53 (1949) (plurality opinion) 
(noting that the accused was denied access to friends, family, and counsel for an extended period 
of time). 
 13. 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
 14. Id. at 322–23. 
 15. Id. at 324. 
 16. Id. at 325 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 326 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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statements at issue,19 but it can be argued it was the four Justices’ concurring 
opinions that set the stage for the overhaul of the system for evaluating such 
confessions, with or without official indictment. 
Immediately following Spano, the Supreme Court began to rely on the 
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel to exclude confessions 
obtained during police interrogations.20  Massiah v. United States was one of 
these early post-Spano cases.21  In that case, the Supreme Court reiterated 
where the suspect has been formally indicted, that suspect should be afforded 
counsel during interrogation.22  The Court in Escobedo v. Illinois, relying on 
Massiah, applied these protections to a suspect who had not formally been 
indicted and found the suspect should have been afforded counsel during 
investigation.23  However, this protection, as it applied to criminal 
investigations, was short lived.  As Justice Stewart noted in Escobedo, the 
majority’s position of excluding investigative confessions represented an 
arguably inappropriate expansion of the protective language of the Sixth 
Amendment.24  By distinguishing the case from the situation in Massiah, he 
made a strong argument against using the Sixth Amendment to protect 
suspects’ statements made during the investigatory phase.25 
It was apparent that suspects in custody faced many of the same, if not 
more, of the coercive pressures from interrogators as police tactics developed, 
and as such, still needed some kind of protection.  Moreover, the courts needed 
a standard by which to evaluate whether or not confessions obtained at that 
stage were in fact admissible and made under conditions that did not violate 
the defendant’s rights.  Thus, the Supreme Court turned again to the Fifth 
Amendment protection against self-incrimination.26 
 
 19. Spano, 360 U.S. at 316 (majority opinion). 
 20. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490–91 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 
U.S. 201, 205–06 (1964). 
 21. 377 U.S. 201. 
 22. Id. at 206. 
 23. 378 U.S. at 492 (“[W]hen the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory—when its 
focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession—our adversary system begins to 
operate, and, under the circumstances here, the accused must be permitted to consult with his 
lawyer.”). 
 24. Id. at 493–94 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority had imported “into [the] 
investigation constitutional concepts historically applicable only after the onset of formal 
prosecutorial proceedings”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. U.S. CONST. amend V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.”). 
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2. Reliance on the Fifth Amendment and Miranda v. Arizona 
After ruling in Malloy v. Hogan that the Fifth Amendment protection 
against self-incrimination was applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment,27 the Supreme Court was free to apply that protection to criminal 
suspects in Miranda v. Arizona.28  Utilizing that Fifth Amendment protection, 
a five-member majority of the Supreme Court articulated that the prosecution 
must show that it honored and used “procedural safeguards” to protect that 
privilege.29  Specifically, the Court announced any suspect in custody must be 
warned of his right to remain silent and right to counsel, and that any statement 
made may be used in his prosecution.30  The Court went on to caution that after 
the warnings have been given, if the suspect “indicates in any manner, at any 
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the 
interrogation must cease.”31  Focusing specifically on the right to remain silent, 
the Court outlined that a suspect must be informed of this right “in clear and 
unequivocal terms.”32  This clarity was crucial, according to the Court, to 
ensure that the suspect understood and effectively considered his rights and the 
consequences of waiving those rights, prior to making any statement.33  
Although not as relevant to the discussion here, the Court did hold the same 
was true for a suspect’s right to counsel, and as such, police interrogators were 
required to respect any request for such assistance.34 
After outlining the content and importance of these warnings, the Court 
moved to a discussion of waiver.35  Reiterating the high standard of proof with 
respect to the waiver of constitutionally protected rights, the Court indicated “a 
heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and 
his right to retained or appointed counsel.”36  Very pertinently to the discussion 
here, the Court noted that “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from 
the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that 
a confession was in fact eventually obtained.”37  Moreover, the Court indicated 
that lengthy interrogations met by an uncommunicative suspect would serve as 
 
 27. 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). 
 28. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 29. Id. at 444. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 47374 (emphasis added). 
 32. Id. at 46768. 
 33. Id. at 46769. 
 34. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472. 
 35. Id. at 475. 
 36. Id. (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964)); see also Carnley v. 
Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962) (“Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.”). 
 37. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
226 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI:221 
strong evidence against a finding of waiver.38  The four dissenting Justices 
argued that the warning requirements would hinder police interrogations and 
discourage confessions.39  Although the majority attempted to address this 
concern by citing to similar successful practices in foreign jurisdictions,40 this 
response did not seem to satisfy or quiet critics, especially in the years directly 
following the decision. 
B. Post-Miranda Jurisprudence: Limiting the Scope of the Landmark 
Decision 
There is conflicting data and serious dissent among scholars regarding the 
actual empirical effect of Miranda.  Some authorities argue that the warning 
requirement hindered police efforts and imposed substantial costs on society as 
a whole.41  Others argue that these hindrances were fictions developed by those 
resisting the expansion of Fifth Amendment protections to include police 
interrogations.42  Even Congress took part in this movement against Miranda, 
and two years after the decision, it enacted a statute that mandated that 
confessions in federal criminal trials be judged on voluntariness.43  However, 
 
 38. Id. at 476. 
 39. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  This argument, that it is necessary to enable officers 
to conduct effective interrogations, is still a very tenable argument today.  See, e.g., Charles 
Weisselberg & Stephanos Bibas, Debate, The Right to Remain Silent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 69, 79 (2010), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Thompkins.pdf (“We 
should not stand in the way of interrogation techniques that produce truthful confessions so long 
as they do not create an unacceptable risk of producing false ones.”). 
 40. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 488–89 (majority opinion) (noting that countries such as England, 
Scotland, and India all incorporate such safeguards without a marked detrimental effect on police 
practice).  Additionally, the Court relied heavily on the experience of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s practice of providing similar warnings prior to interrogation as persuasive that 
Miranda warnings would be effective when enforced at the state and local level.  Id. at 483–86. 
 41. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Cost: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. 
U. L. REV. 387, 437–38 (1996) (suggesting that as many as 3.8% of convictions in “serious 
criminal cases” are lost because of Miranda).  Professor Cassell would likely applaud the Court’s 
decision in Thompkins, because his primary suggestion for reducing these “costs” was eliminating 
waivers and questioning cutoffs.  Id. at 494–496. 
 42. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and 
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 500, 502–03 (1996) (responding to Professor 
Cassell’s statistics by attacking his methodology and suggesting the actual percentage is much 
smaller). 
 43. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 701(a), 82 
Stat. 197, 210–11, invalidated by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).  Specifically, 
this legislation was intended to limit a court’s ability to rely on Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 5, requiring that a defendant taken into custody must be presented before a magistrate 
judge in a timely manner.  See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 451–53 (1957); McNabb 
v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341–42 (1943).  This, however, had the same effect of limiting a 
court’s ability to judge a statement’s admissibility on anything other than voluntariness, and 
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the Supreme Court, in Dickerson v. United States, held that Miranda first and 
foremost announced a constitutional rule.44  Reminding that “Congress may 
not legislatively supersede [its] decisions interpreting and applying the 
Constitution,” the Court held that Miranda trumped Congress’s legislation on 
this point and invalidated the statute.45 
1. Waiver after Miranda 
Evaluating the substance of the opinion, Miranda does not appear to be as 
drastic as some may have feared.  After all, the Court could have placed much 
more serious limitations on statements taken in police custody in the absence 
of an attorney.  Instead, the Court provided for a waiver procedure, allowing 
that suspects were free to make statements in the absence of counsel if they 
had been advised of and understood their rights.46 
Additionally, later cases expounded on the waiver concept, further 
reducing the “dangerous” consequences and impact of Miranda warnings.  
Despite the Miranda Court’s emphasis of a “heavy burden,” in North Carolina 
v. Butler, the Court seemed to soften its standard for such waivers, holding that 
neither an express nor written statement of waiver was required to show that a 
suspect had in fact waived his rights.47  While still standing by Miranda’s 
“knowingly and voluntarily” standard, the Court went on to say that silence, 
coupled with conduct demonstrating an understanding and wish to waive, 
might be enough.48  However, by reaffirming that “the prosecution’s burden is 
great,” the Butler Court did not stray too far from Miranda’s holding.49  
Although the Supreme Court continued to reiterate the informed and voluntary 
requirements for waiver,50 numerous federal circuits, following Butler to the 
letter, have found that particular conduct under certain circumstances was 
enough to show implied waiver.51 
 
regardless, the Supreme Court has consistently reiterated the limited impact of Section 3501(a).  
See Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1562 (2009). 
 44. 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000). 
 45. Id. at 437, 444. 
 46. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).  While the Court did provide for a waiver 
procedure, the strict language of Miranda indicates that a waiver could not be easily established.  
Id.  Many courts and scholars rely on a literal interpretation of this language when criticizing the 
allegedly drastic diversion the Supreme Court has taken from Miranda protections in recent 
years.  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 47. 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 471 
(1980) (per curiam). 
 51. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 218 F.3d 777, 781 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding waiver 
where defendant refused to sign Miranda form then immediately proceeded to talk to police 
officers). 
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Even where Miranda rights are shown to have been knowingly and 
voluntarily waived, courts retain the authority to exclude a statement made 
under such extreme conditions that it would be inadmissible because of due 
process protections.  The Dickerson Court, relying on language in Miranda, 
explained the warning created a safeguard for suspects in police interrogations, 
where coercion inherently “blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary 
statements.”52  For this reason, the majority in Miranda added the specific 
protections through the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination but 
never abandoned the voluntariness requirement.53  But the Court has also, 
assumedly in light of Miranda protections, limited the strength of this 
protection, holding a suspect’s statement may not be found to be involuntary 
without a finding of coercive police behavior.54  However, courts still rarely 
relied on the due process limitation to conclude a suspect involuntarily waived 
his right to remain silent.55 
2. Invocation after Miranda 
More important for the purposes of this analysis, and also more 
challenging for courts, is the situation where a defendant invokes his Miranda 
rights.  This situation differs seriously from the situation where a defendant 
simply waives his rights in one important, practical respect: if the suspect 
invokes his right and then confesses, something changed his mind, whereas 
where there is no invocation, the suspect likely always wanted to communicate 
with police.  The burden is therefore on the prosecution to show that police 
coercion was not responsible for that change.  In that context, the Supreme 
Court has analyzed the issue of waiver and confused the distinction and 
relationship between waiver and invocation issues.  It is important to note at 
the outset that the right to remain silent and the right to counsel are two distinct 
rights, and although the two are inevitably intertwined, waiver is treated 
differently depending on the right at issue.  Additionally, the Supreme Court, 
when addressing issues or applications of law with respect to one of the 
 
 52. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 (2000) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 439 (1966)). 
 53. Id. at 434 (“We have never abandoned this due process jurisprudence, and thus continue 
to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily.”). 
 54. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986).  In support of that limitation, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist reiterated a caution against “expanding ‘currently applicable exclusionary rules 
by erecting additional barriers to placing truthful and probative evidence before state juries’.”  Id. 
at 166 (quoting Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 447, 48889 (1972)). 
 55. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 953 F.2d 562, 565–66 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding a 
suspect suffering from heroin withdrawal was still capable of giving a voluntary statement).  
However, the Supreme Court again reiterated valid waivers must be made knowingly and 
voluntarily, consistent with the holding in Miranda.  Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 
(1987). 
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Miranda rights, often fails to effectively explain its analysis or identify 
whether the law applies exclusively to one of the rights, further confusing the 
relationship.  Because the right to remain silent was specifically at issue in 
Thompkins, the background here focuses primarily on that right. 
Invocation of the right to remain silent has created many questions for the 
courts, especially, how the police are to proceed once a suspect does in fact 
invoke his right to remain silent.  In Michigan v. Mosley, the Supreme Court, 
interpreting language from Miranda, held a suspect’s right to remain silent, 
and thus cut off questioning, must be “scrupulously honored” by 
interrogators.56  However, the Court strayed from a close, literal interpretation 
of Miranda, finding that “any statement taken after the person invokes his 
privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion” did not forever 
prohibit questioning of a suspect.57  Instead, the Court limited this to mean that 
police may return to questioning “after the passage of a significant period of 
time” and a new reading of Miranda rights.58  However, the Court failed to 
define what actually constituted “a significant period of time,” and it still 
appeared to be true that police were unable to persist in questioning directly 
following an invocation of rights.59  Lower courts have attempted to interpret 
what kind of time is required before agents may resume questioning, with most 
articulating that there needs to be some span of time or “cooling off period” 
before the suspect may be reread his Miranda rights and questioning may 
resume.60 
Most pertinent to the discussion of Thompkins is the question of when the 
right to silence is invoked.  Courts have struggled to decide these kinds of 
cases without any clear definition of invocation requirements, and this specific 
issue had never reached the Supreme Court until now.61  However, the Court 
faced this same question with respect to the right to counsel in Davis v. United 
States.62  In that case, the Court held that officers may continue to question a 
defendant who has made an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel, 
relying on the established premise that officers are free to question a suspect 
after a valid waiver.63  Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, reiterated 
that where “a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have 
understood only that the suspect might be invoking his right to counsel, [Court] 
 
 56. 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436). 
 57. Id. at 100–02 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473–74). 
 58. Id. at 106. 
 59. See id. at 105. 
 60. Compare Charles v. Smith, 894 F.2d 718, 726 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding “a few minutes” 
is not enough time before resuming questions), with Grooms v. Keeney, 826 F.2d 883, 884, 886 
(9th Cir. 1987) (finding four hour break between questioning was sufficient). 
 61. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 62. 512 U.S. 452, 454 (1994). 
 63. Id. at 459. 
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precedents do not require the cessation of questioning,” shifting the burden to 
the suspect to make such an “unambiguous request.”64  However, as the Court 
pointed out, this right is fundamentally different from the right to remain silent 
in that once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, questioning may not 
continue until an attorney is present.65  Such is not the case with respect to the 
right to remain silent, where police may continue the interrogation after a 
sufficient period of time has elapsed.66  The Court went on to reason that if 
police were required to cease interrogation in the face of an “ambiguous” 
request for counsel, this would hinder police efforts,67 the same concern 
articulated by some of the Miranda critics. 
Many courts, expanding the Davis holding, have utilized the unambiguous 
standard in determining if a suspect has invoked his right to remain silent, 
despite the fact that the Supreme Court had never squarely addressed the 
issue.68  At the federal level, “every circuit that has addressed the issue 
squarely has concluded that Davis applies to both components of Miranda.”69  
Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, none of these courts provided sufficient 
reasoning as to their decision, and the little reasoning that a few courts 
provided has been criticized as “cursory.”70  Most states have followed suit in 
an equally unsatisfactory fashion, and any state that adopted the Davis standard 
did so with respect to both of the Miranda protections.71  It is against this 
convoluted backdrop that the Supreme Court decided Berghuis v. Thompkins. 
II.  BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS 
A. Facts of the Case 
Van Chester Thompkins was suspected of a shooting at a shopping mall in 
Michigan, in which one victim died.72  Two Michigan officers travelled to 
Ohio, to where Thompkins had fled and was being held, to interview him.73  
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 458; see also Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 48485 (1981). 
 66. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 56–60. 
 67. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460. 
 68. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 69. Bui v. DiPaolo, 170 F.3d 232, 239 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Marcy Strauss, The Sounds 
of Silence: Reconsidering the Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent Under Miranda, 17 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 773, 785 (2009) (noting that no federal appellate court had limited Davis only 
to the right to counsel). 
 70. See Strauss, supra note 69, at 786. 
 71. Id. at 825–29 app. (providing a detailed list of the states that have applied Davis to the 
right to remain silent). 
 72. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2256 (2010). 
 73. Id. 
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The interrogation took place in an eight-foot by ten-foot room and lasted 
nearly three hours.74  At the outset of the interrogation, Thompkins was read 
his Miranda rights from a form and asked to read the last warning, regarding 
his right to counsel, and Thompkins complied.75  However, when asked to sign 
the form indicating that he understood these rights, Thompkins declined.76  The 
record contained conflicting evidence as to whether Thompkins verbally 
confirmed that he understood these rights, and the interrogation began.77  
Thompkins never said that he wished to remain silent or wanted an attorney, 
but officers attested that he did remain “largely silent” during the entire 
interrogation.78  Thompkins gave a few limited responses, such as “yeah,” 
“no,” and “I don’t know,” and communicated by nodding his head.79  
However, two hours and forty-five minutes into the interrogation, Thompkins 
responded affirmatively by answering “yes” to three direct questions from the 
officers: “Do you believe in God?,” “Do you pray to God?,” and “Do you pray 
to God to forgive you for shooting that boy down?”80  After these questions, 
Thompkins still refused to give a written confession, and the interrogation 
ended.81 
Thompkins was charged with various counts, including first degree 
murder, and moved to suppress his statements, claiming he had invoked his 
right to remain silent, which required the officers to stop the interrogation, and 
had not waived his right to remain silent, thus his statements were 
involuntary.82  The trial court denied his motion, and when the jury found him 
guilty on all counts, Thompkins was “sentenced to life in prison without 
parole.”83  The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected Thompkins’ appeal, 
finding that he had not invoked his right to remain silent, but rather waived his 
right.84  Thompkins’ appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was subsequently 
denied.85  Thompkins then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 
governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2256. 
 79. Id. at 2256–57. 
 80. Id. at 2257. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 2257–58. 
 84. People v. Thompkins, No. 242478, 2004 WL 202898, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 
2004). 
 85. People v. Thompkins, 683 N.W.2d 676, 676 (Mich. 2004). 
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(hereinafter “AEDPA”),86 in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan.87  That court rejected Thompkins’ motion, finding that 
the Michigan Court of Appeals’ determination that he had waived his right was 
not unreasonable, as required by the AEDPA.88  Thompkins was granted a 
certificate of appealability.89  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the petition because the state 
court’s decision was both an unreasonable application of law and an 
unreasonable determination based on the evidence.90  That court relied heavily 
on the fact that Thompkins had remained nearly silent for the first two hours 
and forty-five minutes of the interrogation, and according to the court, this 
clearly should have demonstrated to the officers that “Thompkins did not wish 
to waive his rights.”91  The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.92 
B. The Majority Opinion 
In his opinion for the majority, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito, first addressed the invocation 
issue.93  Thompkins argued that by remaining silent for a sufficient period of 
time, he had invoked his right to remain silent, and therefore the officers 
should have stopped the questioning prior to his incriminating responses; 
Justice Kennedy discredited this argument as “unpersuasive.”94  After 
acknowledging this presented a novel issue for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
indicated there was “no principled reason” not to apply the Davis standard.95  
He then transitioned quickly into a brief discussion of the policy concerns, 
specifically noting that an unambiguous waiver requirement reduces the need 
for police to make a judgment in cases where it may not be completely clear if 
the right has actually been invoked by the suspect.96  Justice Kennedy 
 
 86. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006).  The AEDPA provides that a court cannot grant a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus unless the state court’s ruling involved a misapplication of established 
federal law or an unreasonable determination based on the presented evidence.  Id. § 2254(d). 
 87. Thompkins v. Berghuis, No. 05-CV-70188-DT, 2006 WL 2811303, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 
Sept. 28, 2006). 
 88. Id. at *1314. 
 89. Thompkins v. Berghuis, No. 05-70188, 2006 WL 3086916, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 
2006). 
 90. Thompkins v. Berghuis, 547 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 91. Id. at 58588. 
 92. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 48, 48 (2009). 
 93. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 225960 (2010). 
 94. Id. at 2259. 
 95. Id. at 2260; see also The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases: Fifth Amendment, 
124 HARV. L. REV. 189, 195 (2010) [hereinafter Fifth Amendment] (“As a matter of practical 
jurisprudence, the Court was wise to keep the application of invocation rules consistent across the 
Miranda rights.”). 
 96. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260. 
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concluded, “Thompkins did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he 
did not want to talk with the police. . . . [H]e did neither, so he did not invoke 
his right to remain silent.”97 
The majority opinion continued with the issue of whether Thompkins 
waived his right to remain silent.98  Although Justice Kennedy found Miranda 
language could indicate waivers must be explicit, he followed up by 
enumerating the various cases that, according to the majority, reduced the 
impact of this “heavy burden.”99  The majority validated implied waivers, so 
long as those waivers honored the knowingly and voluntarily requirements 
outlined in post-Miranda cases.100  Because Thompkins was read his Miranda 
rights and at least indicated he could read and understand English, the majority 
determined he understood the right he waived.101  Additionally, the majority 
placed importance on that fact that Thompkins did answer the detectives’ 
questions when he could have chosen to remain silent.102  Finally, there was 
nothing to indicate the statements were coerced, and therefore the majority 
concluded Thompkins knowingly and voluntarily, and therefore effectively, 
waived his right to remain silent.103  Thompkins also further contended that 
even if his three responses did constitute a waiver of his right to remain silent, 
the detectives were required to discontinue questioning until they had obtained 
that waiver.104  Specifically, he contended the detectives impermissibly 
obtained his responses, which constituted a waiver, because they continued to 
question him during the extended period before he gave those responses.105  
However, Justice Kennedy quickly dismissed this argument by relying on 
Butler and finding that police may continue to question suspects until that 
suspect either invokes or waives his right to remain silent.106  In conclusion, 
the Court held that suspects like Thompkins who have not effectively invoked 
their right to remain silent waive that right by voluntarily replying to police 
interrogation.107 
C. Justice Sotomayor’s Strongly-Worded Dissent 
In her dissenting opinion, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, tackled the majority’s opinion and rationale head on: 
 
 97. Id. (citations omitted). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 226061; see discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 100. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260–61. 
 101. Id. at 2262. 
 102. Id. at 2263. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2263–64 (2010). 
 107. Id. at 2264. 
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  Today’s decision turns Miranda upside down.  Criminal suspects must 
now unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent—which, 
counterintuitively, requires them to speak.  At the same time, suspects will be 
legally presumed to have waived their rights even if they have given no clear 
expression of their intent to do so.108 
According to the dissenting Justices, Thompkins was entitled to relief, 
regardless of the invocation issue, if the prosecution could not establish he 
waived his right, and so they began their analysis there.109  The dissenters 
reiterated the heavy burden that the prosecution must satisfy to show waiver, 
especially when that waiver is implied, specifically noting that the Miranda 
court determined “mere silence is not enough.”110  Relying on Butler, Justice 
Sotomayor indicated that when waiver is implied, as it was in Thompkins’ 
case, that burden is even heavier for the prosecution to satisfy.111  These 
principles, derived from Miranda and Butler, when applied to Thompkins’ 
circumstances should lead to one obvious conclusion, according to the 
Justices.112  They explained Thompkins’ refusal to sign the Miranda form, in 
conjunction with his overall silence, should be enough to establish not 
necessarily that he invoked his right, but at least that he did not waive it, 
especially in light of the complex, conflicting record and testimony of the 
interrogating officers.113  Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority’s 
conclusion that Thompkins’ actions over the three-hour interrogation 
constituted waiver as “objectively unreasonable.”114 
For the dissenting Justices, the analysis should have stopped there.115  
Because the issue could have been decided without announcing the new rule 
 
 108. Id. at 2278 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 109. Id. at 2268; see also Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers & the Am. Civil 
Liberties Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8–12, Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 
(No. 08-1470) (arguing the precedential and practical reasons for a “waiver first” policy, which 
would require police to obtain a waiver before initiating interrogation). 
 110. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2269 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting North Carolina v. 
Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)).  Justice Sotomayor went on to indicate the Butler 
pronouncement was exceedingly close to a per se rule that silence was not enough to establish 
waiver, thus reinforcing her proposition that the case before the Court should have one obvious 
conclusion: Thompkins did not waive his right to remain silent.  Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 2270; see also Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 39, at 73 (“The majority found an 
implied Miranda waiver on an extreme set of facts.”). 
 113. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 2271.  As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, the argument for a finding of implied 
waiver under these circumstances is weak; it is even weaker when considered in conjunction with 
case law that supports the notion that officers should be required to obtain waiver before 
interrogation starts.  See Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers & the Am. Civil 
Liberties Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 109, at 15. 
 115. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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on invocation, the majority allegedly violated principles of judicial restraint.116  
Specifically, the dissent articulated that the question of whether or not the 
Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Miranda laws, as required by 
the AEDPA, could be decided on the waiver issue alone.117  Agreeing with the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Justice Sotomayor advocated that because 
Thompkins was entitled to relief under the AEDPA, there was no need to 
address his claim on the grounds of invocation.118  Despite this, she continued 
on to tackle the invocation issue, noting how “flatly” the majority’s 
unnecessary invocation pronouncement contradicted basic and longstanding 
Miranda principles.119  The dissenters disagreed with the majority’s ruling for 
multiple reasons.  First, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority’s “novel 
application” of Davis.120  She pointed out that Davis involved the right to 
counsel, not the right to remain silent, which was at issue in this case, and the 
suspect in Davis expressly waived his Miranda rights.121  Although the 
dissenters maintained that the invocation issue need not be decided by the 
Court, if they were to apply a rule, it would be the “scrupulously honored” 
standard promulgated in Mosley.122  Thus, if at any time a suspect indicated 
that he wishes to remain silent, the police must discontinue questioning.123  
Justice Sotomayor specifically noted that sitting in silence in the same manner 
as Thompkins did and other similar behaviors cannot be understood to mean 
anything other than an intent to remain silent.124 
She also countered the majority’s argument that the Davis standard 
provides police interrogators with a bright line rule, arguing Mosley is more 
appropriate and workable in practice, as evidenced by its successful and 
effective application over the past thirty-five years.125  Most importantly, the 
dissenters attacked the application of Davis as unworkable in practice.126  As 
 
 116. Id.  Under the AEDPA’s “deferential standard,” the Supreme Court can, and should, 
decline to answer constitutional questions not necessary to the resolution of the issue before the 
Court.  Id.; see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 
467 U.S. 138, 157 (1984) (citing a string of precedent supporting the rule of judicial restraint). 
 117. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2270 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice Sotomayor also 
articulated that because the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to decide the invocation 
issue, 547 F.3d 572, 588 (6th Cir. 2008), the Supreme Court was free to remand that issue without 
deciding it.  Id. at 2274 n.6. 
 118. Id. at 2271. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 2274. 
 121. Id. at 2275. 
 122. Id. (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975)); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 56–60. 
 123. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 124. Id. at 227576. 
 125. Id. at 2276. 
 126. Id. 
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they noted, warning a suspect he has the right to remain silent is “unlikely to 
convey that he must speak (and must do so in some particular fashion) to 
ensure the right will be protected.”127  Additionally, they advocated that police, 
in the face of an ambiguous statement, are free to ask for clarification to 
determine whether or not the suspect wishes to invoke his right to remain silent 
rather than simply foreclosing that right at even slightly ambiguous 
statements.128  According to Justice Sotomayor, the rule announced by the 
majority had been utilized by lower courts, resulting in the admission of 
statements procured after seemingly unambiguous invocations of the right to 
remain silent.129  The dissenters believed the majority’s ruling simply endorsed 
such misguided admissions.130 
III.  A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE IMPACT AND FUTURE OF BERGHUIS V. 
THOMPKINS—WAS THE MAJORITY’S CONCLUSION REALLY NOVEL? 
This section discusses numerous issues relating to the Supreme Court’s 
Berghuis v. Thompkins decision.  These issues include criticisms of the 
majority opinion, the relationship and impact of Thompkins with respect to 
Miranda, and an outlook on the future precedential value of the Thompkins 
standard.  It is important to note that waiver and invocation are two completely 
distinct issues with respect to the right to remain silent, although the two issues 
are inevitably intertwined.  Courts often do not effectively discuss the issues in 
a clear manner, causing confusion between the two.  This analysis, while 
addressing the waiver issue, focuses more on the invocation issue and 
unambiguous standard, as this was the novel issue in this case and the more 
controversial pronouncement by the Court. 
A. Application of the Davis Standard to the Right to Remain Silent 
Despite the fact that Justice Sotomayor did not believe it was necessary for 
the majority Justices to address the invocation rule, she criticized the 
application of Davis to Thompkins’ case.131  Justice Sotomayor pointed out the 
very obvious issue with that application: “Davis involved the right to counsel, 
not the right to silence.”132  However, Justice Kennedy seemed to simply 
ignore that distinction, casually announcing that there was no reason not to 
apply Davis with little other satisfactory explanation.133  It is difficult to 
 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2277 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 2277–78. 
 131. Id. at 2273–76. 
 132. Id. at 2275. 
 133. Id. at 2260 (majority opinion). 
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understand why the majority would expand Davis in such a manner without at 
least first addressing concerns about the separation of the two rights. 
1. Lower Courts Consistently Applied the Davis Standard to the Right to 
Remain Silent 
Even prior to the Court’s opinion in Berghuis v. Thompkins, this 
application of Davis to the right to silence had been considered by various 
lower courts and scholars.134  As a matter of law, the right to remain silent and 
the right to counsel are two completely distinct rights.135  Additionally, some 
scholars have suggested that the right to remain silent is the principal right 
protected by the Miranda decision, and the right to counsel is secondary 
insofar as it further enables a suspect to invoke that right.136  Practically, the 
application of one standard to two different rights has the potential to produce 
extremely discordant results.137  As mentioned above, the right to counsel 
requires police to permanently discontinue questioning until the suspect does 
have access to his counsel; this is not the case for the right to remain silent.138  
Because the majority in Thompkins expanded the Davis ruling to the right to 
remain silent, suspects are required to assert their right in such an unambiguous 
manner,139 but because police may ignore any “ambiguous” requests, the 
questioning can continue and suspects may essentially be coerced into making 
an incriminating statement.  As one scholar noted, this places police in a “win-
win situation.”140 
Unfortunately, no court that has expanded Davis in this manner has 
provided a sufficient explanation as to why this standard is appropriate for both 
rights.  One possibility though is that the courts are much more protective of 
the right to counsel, and thus, it seems natural that the standard for the more 
rigidly guarded right would be adequate for the secondary right to remain 
 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir. 1995); Medina v. 
Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1100–01 (11th Cir. 1995); State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54, 65 (Vt. 1995). 
 135. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2275 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96, 104 n.10 (1975).  But see Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 648 (1984) (suggesting that 
the two distinct rights could, and possibly should, operate under the same set of rules). 
 136. Strauss, supra 69, at 786. 
 137. Id.  However, the flip side of this argument is that a unified standard actually creates 
more simplicity for police officers to apply one standard to the two rights in “closely related 
situations.”  Fifth Amendment, supra note 95, at 196. 
 138. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 139. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (majority opinion). 
 140. Strauss, supra note 69, at 818.  Courts consistently cite a desire to remove police from 
“questionable” situations where they are required to make a determination about a request.  See 
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260 (noting that allowing unambiguous requests would require police 
to make “difficult decisions” about a suspect’s intent).  However, when police are in a position to 
make those crucial determinations, it further disadvantages suspects.  See Strauss, supra note 69, 
at 818. 
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silent.141  Edwards v. Arizona dealt with such requests for counsel during an 
interrogation.142  After noting that “additional safeguards are necessary when 
the accused asks for counsel,” the Court announced that a suspect, after 
requesting counsel, may not be re-questioned by police unless counsel is made 
available to him.143  Of course the suspect may reinitiate conversation with the 
police, but unless this occurs, all questioning must be cut off indefinitely.144  
Recently, the Supreme Court limited this in Maryland v. Shatzer.145  There, the 
Court held that police may re-question a suspect when there has been a 
sufficient break in custody.146  However, compare the necessary break after a 
request for counsel, at the least a matter of days, to the break required after an 
invocation of the right to remain silent.  In Michigan v. Mosley, the Court held 
a two-hour break after a suspect indicated he wished to remain silent was a 
sufficient period of time for officers to reinitiate questioning.147  Although the 
two dissenting Justices in Mosley made a compelling argument that such a 
short break in questioning was insufficient to protect suspects from the 
coercive atmosphere of a custodial setting,148 courts have consistently 
interpreted this to mean that after a brief break in questioning, a suspect may 
again be interrogated without violation of basic Miranda principles.  This stark 
contrast—two hours versus a minimum fourteen day period—demonstrates the 
importance courts place on the right to counsel and may provide an 
explanation, albeit a somewhat unsatisfactory one, as to why these two rights, 
though distinguishable, could governed by the same standard. 
2. Was Davis Wrongly Decided? 
Not only might Davis be an inappropriate standard for cases like 
Thompkins’, but many scholars advocate that Davis itself was wrongly decided 
and should be overruled for the right to counsel as well.149  First, Davis has 
 
 141. The Supreme Court always adopted “more stringent” standards with respect to the right 
to counsel, consistently requiring that an invocation of the right to counsel “operates as an 
absolute bar” on any further interrogation by police.  Strauss, supra note 69, at 781. 
 142. 451 U.S. 477, 478 (1981). 
 143. Id. at 484–85. 
 144. Id. 
 145. 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010). 
 146. Id. at 1223–24 (finding that a fourteen-day release from custody was sufficient). 
 147. 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). 
 148. Id. at 118 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 149. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 69, at 803–04; see also Janet Ainsworth, In a Different 
Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259 (1993) 
(articulating practical concerns, even prior to the Davis ruling, about requiring unambiguous 
requests and how this works against certain groups).  These concerns were flatly rejected by the 
majority in Davis.  512 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1994) (recognizing that the unambiguous standard 
“might disadvantage some suspects,” but placing this secondary to the importance of effective 
law enforcement). 
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been attacked on the same grounds with respect to both the right to counsel, 
which it was promulgated for, and with respect to the right to remain silent: it 
is inconsistent with the suspect protections outlined in Miranda v. Arizona.150  
In an article that pre-dates the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompkins, 
Professor Marcy Strauss challenged Davis and discredited major meritorious 
arguments in favor of requiring unambiguous invocations.151  She argued that 
rather than indicating uncertainty about the suspect’s willingness to talk, 
ambiguity could indicate a suspect is actually unsure of how to proceed in the 
interrogation setting, he is intimidated by the circumstances, or he fears the 
repercussions of asserting his rights.152  However, these reasons do not justify 
foreclosing an attempted invocation as an unsuccessful one and could have 
dangerous consequences for unsure or indecisive suspects.153  Additionally, it 
is unclear that allowing ambiguous statements to qualify as invocations would 
disrupt or thwart effective police practices in the manner Justice Kennedy 
cautions.154  More importantly, allowing police to ignore allegedly ambiguous 
requests seriously inhibits a suspect’s ability to protect himself from self-
incrimination.155  The Davis standard clearly created some serious questions in 
the minds of scholars, and the problems they have identified are only 
exacerbated by courts’ application of that standard to the right to remain silent. 
B. The Call for Miranda Warning Reform 
1. The Counterintuitive Problem: Why isn’t Silence Enough? 
As the dissent pointed out, the warning “you have the right to remain 
silent” indicates that a suspect may in fact remain silent.156  It is uncontested 
that Thompkins did remain primarily silent during the first two hours and 
 
 150. See Strauss, supra note 69, at 803–04. 
 151. Id.  The three specific arguments addressed by Professor Strauss are that ambiguous 
requests indicate a suspect is unsure he actually wants to invoke that right, law enforcement 
interests should allow interrogation to proceed in the face of ambiguity, and any cost-benefit 
analysis requires unambiguous requests.  Id. at 803–15. 
 152. Id. at 804–05. 
 153. Id. at 804–08. 
 154. Id. at 809–14. 
 155. Id. at 806–08. 
 156. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2276 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  In 
support of this argument, Amici Curiae cited to the lingual definition of the term “indication,” 
relied upon very heavily in Miranda jurisprudence, to show that a suspect may invoke his right by 
simply remaining silent.  Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers & the Am. Civil 
Liberties Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 109, at 26–27 
(“‘Indication’ is a broad concept, denoting ‘something (as a signal, sign, suggestion) that serves 
to indicate.’  Plainly, one ‘sign’ a suspect can offer that he ‘wishes to remain silent’ is to do just 
that—remain silent.” (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1150 
(1986))). 
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forty-five minutes of his interrogation;157 however, Justice Kennedy deemed 
that behavior insufficient to establish Thompkins wished to invoke his right.158  
In defense of the majority’s conclusion, Thompkins did respond sporadically to 
a few questions of the officers during that time, rather than remaining 
completely silent.159  There were conflicting stories regarding the actual 
interrogation, and it was suggested that Thompkins responded with a few head 
nods and “yeah” or “no” in response to questions completely irrelevant to the 
crime.160  If this is true and Thompkins remained silent in response to relevant 
questions about the alleged crime, this raises a whole new issue.  
Unfortunately, because police are allowed to continue to question suspects 
until they have successfully invoked their right to remain silent, it is unlikely 
and impracticable that a suspect would actually sit in complete and total 
silence in the face of ongoing, extended interrogation by officers.  Based on the 
standards set by the majority Justices in Thompkins, it is rare that a suspect’s 
silence will be enough to invoke that right, and at the very least should require 
an amended Miranda warning that adequately informs suspects of the behavior 
that is expected of them if they wish to successfully invoke their right to 
remain silent. 
Professor Strauss addressed this issue in her critique of Davis.161  In that 
article, she identifies various categories of suspect statements that have 
consistently been determined as ambiguous by courts.162  One of those 
categories addressed by Professor Strauss was simple silence.163  In one sense, 
this could be viewed as the “ultimate invocation,” because the suspect is acting 
on what they wish to do—remain silent.164  Additionally, like Justice 
Sotomayor noted, typical Miranda warnings actually advise suspects that they 
may in fact simply remain silent.165  Like Professor Strauss points out, courts 
 
 157. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2267 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the officers 
characterized the interrogation as “very, very one-sided” and admitted Thompkins remained 
“largely” silent). 
 158. Id. at 2260 (majority opinion). 
 159. See id. at 2256–57. 
 160. See id.; Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers & the Am. Civil Liberties 
Union as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, supra note 109, at 27–28 (attacking the 
responsive characterization of the Thompkins’ behavior during the interrogation as 
“inappropriately selective”). 
 161. Strauss, supra note 69, at 803–15. 
 162. Id. at 787–88. 
 163. Id.  Other categories identified by Professor Strauss include questions concerning the 
right, the use of words such as “maybe” or “could,” logical hedges, requests to do something 
besides speak, vague comments about cooperativeness, comments that indicate an unwillingness 
to discuss specific topics, and comments which are ambiguous due to other actions or comments.  
Id.  She challenges the courts’ labeling of these kinds of statements as “ambiguous.”  Id. 
 164. Id. at 792. 
 165. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2267–68 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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are generally hesitant to find that silence constitutes an unambiguous 
invocation.166  These inconsistent and counterintuitive findings are 
understandably a cause for concern for many scholars like Strauss and 
represent yet another argument not only against the expansion of Davis, but in 
favor of Miranda warning reform altogether. 
2. Confusion with the Right to Cut Off Questioning 
In a recent article, Professor Laurent Sacharoff addresses this confusion 
and advocates the right to remain silent actually refers to two distinct rights: 
the right to remain silent and the right to cut off questioning.167  According to 
Professor Sacharoff, the Supreme Court never differentiates the two, although 
clearly confirming their existence, thus creating this confusion.168  Professor 
Sacharoff correctly views the right to remain silent as a liberty which may be 
protected until that right is waived by the suspect.169  Although Professor 
Sacharoff disagrees with the waiver terminology used by the Thompkins’ 
Court, he allows that regardless, the majority’s opinion is probably correct in 
that a suspect may either remain silent or speak, where speaking effectively 
“waives” the suspect’s liberty to remain silent.170  However, Professor 
Sacharoff disagrees with the Thompkins holding with respect to the sub-right to 
cut off police questioning.171  He argues that the Thompkins’ holding requires 
the right to cut off questioning be unambiguously invoked by unambiguously 
invoking the right to remain silent.172  Professor Sacharoff’s primary concern is 
that this sub-right is not represented in the current “right to remain silent” 
 
 166. Strauss, supra note 69, at 792; see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sicari, 752 N.E.2d 684, 695 
(Mass. 2001) (finding that a thirty to forty minute period of silence was insufficient), cert. denied, 
534 U.S. 1142 (2002); Green v. Commonwealth, 500 S.E.2d 835, 838–39 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) 
(finding that a two and a half hour silence was insufficient).  But see State v. Rossignol, 627 A.2d 
524, 527 (Me. 1993) (finding that a suspect had sufficiently invoked his right to remain silent 
when he refused to answer a set of questions over a twenty minute period).  In a recent case, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court found that a suspect did effectively invoke his right to remain 
silent by nodding his head in response to the direct question “So you don’t want to speak?” and 
not speaking.  Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 343–44 (2012).  Clarke may have 
identified the very narrow scope of circumstances where a suspect can invoke his right without 
speaking under Thompkins. 
 167. Laurent Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 
4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711410; see also Fifth Amendment, supra 95, at 196–97 
(arguing there is a right to cut off questioning which exists separately from the two traditional 
Miranda rights). 
 168. Sacharoff, supra note 167 (manuscript at 5). 
 169. Id. (manuscript at 35). 
 170. Id. (manuscript at 33–34). 
 171. Id. (manuscript at 4445). 
 172. Id. (manuscript at 45). 
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Miranda warning, leaving suspects unaware of this right and how best to 
protect it.173 
Professor Sacharoff advocates “aligning” these two sub-rights as a possible 
solution.174  This would require police to obtain a waiver before questioning 
suspects, clearing up confusion between the separate waiver and invocation 
requirements for the two sub-rights.175  Moreover, this would shift the burden 
of obtaining a waiver to the police, better protecting suspects’ rights in a 
manner more faithful to Miranda.176  Professor Sacharoff laments that the 
Court accomplished this harmony that he encourages; however, it did so by 
moving in the opposite direction.177  While his analysis is critical of the 
Thompkins holding, it does clarify Justice Sotomayor’s concerns about the 
“counterintuitive” character of the majority’s holding.178 
But even if the Court were to distinguish the right to cut off questioning 
from the right to remain silent, there still may not be room for consensus 
between the majority and dissent in Thompkins.  Justice Sotomayor took issue 
with the majority insofar as the five Justices concluded that the police were 
correct to question Thompkins during the lengthy interrogation despite the fact 
he remained relatively silent over that period.179  Essentially, the heart of this 
problem was Thompkins’ ability to cut of questioning, not his ability to remain 
silent.  Effectively, Justice Sotomayor argued that by remaining silent, 
Thompkins invoked his right to cut off questioning.180  Even if she had 
addressed these two aligned rights in the dissent, Justice Kennedy and the 
majority Justices disagreed, arguing that Thompkins’ actions and words, or 
lack thereof, were altogether insufficient to invoke the right to remain silent, 
which would have terminated the interrogation.181  The ultimate point of 
dissent here is the level of action or words required to invoke this right, 
whether it be to remain silent or to cut off questioning. 
Taking an Ocham’s Razor approach to this concern may provide some 
insight: the Court could simply rewrite the warnings that officers must give to 
 
 173. Id. (manuscript at 44–45) (noting this disadvantages unknowing suspects). 
 174. Sacharoff, supra note 167 (manuscript at 42). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id.; see also Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CA. L. REV. 1519, 1577–90 
(2008) (arguing that Davis and current police practices reduced the true Miranda safeguards that 
suspects waive their rights before questioning to a requirement that suspects now invoke their 
right to cut off questioning). 
 177. Sacharoff, supra note 167 (manuscript at 42).  But see Fifth Amendment, supra note 95, 
at 194 (arguing that if the right to cut off questioning is tied to both traditional Miranda rights, the 
Court was correct to apply one standard to both rights to promote consistent protection of all three 
rights). 
 178. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2278 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 179. Id. at 2266. 
 180. See id. at 2273. 
 181. Id. at 2260 (majority opinion). 
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suspects.182  Justice Sotomayor was correct to imply that the phrase “you have 
the right to remain silent” very apparently does not convey “you must 
unambiguously and almost surely affirmatively convey that you wish to remain 
silent,” even to the most educated of suspects.183  While the Miranda 
protections have changed significantly since the landmark decision, the actual 
warnings issued to suspects have remained relatively unchanged.  The brunt of 
Miranda was to ensure that suspects in custody “be adequately and effectively 
apprised of [their] rights.”184  The Court would only be reaffirming its 
adherence to Miranda if it had taken the extra step to reword the warnings.  
This obvious disjunct between the warnings and the actual constitutional 
protections embodied in their words may be contributing to the more 
resounding criticism that Berghuis v. Thompkins is another step in the direction 
away from Miranda v. Arizona. 
C. Faithfulness to Miranda—Is Miranda “Dead”? 
Another concern with respect to Berghuis v. Thompkins is the Court’s 
faithfulness to the Miranda opinion and protections.  Although the bulk of this 
analysis focuses on the invocation issue because this was the new issue before 
the Supreme Court in Thompkins, it is also necessary to address the issue of 
waiver.185  Scholars disagree as to how exactly the waiver and invocation of 
the right to remain silent interact, but there is a general consensus that the 
Thompkins Court significantly reduced the burden required to establish waiver, 
although this trend is not a new one.186  What is most interesting is that the 
majority of recent courts that have relied on Thompkins have utilized the 
majority’s holding with respect to the waiver issue in making their decision.187  
Although the Court addressed a novel issue in Thompkins with respect to 
invocation, this case represents a culmination of more recent Miranda 
 
 182. The Court entertained the idea that these spoken warnings may not be the most effective 
means of conveying these rights.  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
 183. See Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2276 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 184. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. 
 185. Note that Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, addressed the waiver issue 
secondarily, yet more extensively.  Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2260–63.  However, Justice 
Sotomayor, writing for the dissent, believed that the waiver issue was the only issue necessary to 
resolve this case.  Id. at 2268, 2273 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 186. See Charles Weisselberg, Elena Kagan and the Death of Miranda, HUFFINGTON POST 
(June 1, 2010, 02:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-weisselberg/elena-kagan-and-
the-death_b_596447.html (labeling the Thompkins decision a “death blow” to Miranda). 
 187. Most courts rely on Berghuis v. Thompkins as a recent reiteration by the Supreme Court 
that the burden for the prosecution is not as great as it has been interpreted to be based on the 
language in Miranda v. Arizona.  See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 630 F.3d 397, 409 (5th Cir. 
2011); United States v. Huggins, 392 F. App’x 50, 57 (3d Cir. 2010); Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 
424, 433 (6th Cir. 2010); Hall v. Thomas, 611 F.3d 1259, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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jurisprudence that has “retreated” from the strict waiver showing required 
under a literal interpretation of the Court’s language in Miranda.188 
This criticism that the Supreme Court has strayed from the strong 
protections outlined in Miranda, however, is not a new one.  As noted above, 
the Court, in the years following the decision in Miranda, consistently whittled 
away at the strength of that holding.189  The safeguards outlined and authorized 
by Miranda were enacted to combat the inherent pressures of police 
interrogation.190  As a practical point, it is questionable how effective Miranda 
warnings actually are, and there is strong evidence that police investigators 
commonly utilize a variety of strategies and tactics to circumvent Miranda’s 
strong protections.191  Officers also question suspects in a manner that elicits 
an implied waiver or persuade suspects that it is in their best interest to waive 
their rights.192  These techniques are designed by police to “overcome a 
suspect’s resistance and to induce him or her to confess,” with little regard for 
the accuracy of the statement or guilt of the suspect.193  It is these concerns that 
justify the need for safeguards like Miranda warnings in the first place. 
Most agree, including Professor Charles Weisselberg, that the interrogation 
pressures are still a concern today.194  Professor Weisselberg comes to the 
pessimistic conclusion that, “[a]s a prophylactic device to protect suspects’ 
privilege against self-incrimination . . . Miranda is largely dead.”195  In support 
of this, he offers numerous statements that courts have held to be insufficient 
to invoke protection under the Davis standard.196  Echoing this harsh criticism, 
Professor Strauss goes so far as to criticize the lengths, she argues, judges take 
to classify seemingly unambiguous statements as insufficient invocations 
 
 188. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 2261 (“[T]his ‘heavy burden’ is not more than the burden to 
establish waiver by a preponderance of the evidence.” (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 
157, 168 (1986))). 
 189. See supra Part I.B. 
 190. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 448 (1966) (“Interrogation still takes place in privacy.  
Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes 
on in the interrogation rooms.”). 
 191. For example, police in a self-reported survey admit to isolating the suspect in a small 
room, identifying contradictions in the suspect’s story and trying to establish rapport with the 
suspect to build the suspect’s trust.  Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: 
A Self-Report Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 389 (2007). 
 192. Id. at 383. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See Weisselberg, supra note 176, at 1529–37. 
 195. Id. at 1591. 
 196. Id. at 1580–81; see, e.g., People v. Stitely, 108 P.3d 182, 195–96 (Cal. 2005) (“I think 
it’s time for me to stop talking.”); United States v. Banks, 78 F.3d 1190, 1196–98 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“I don’t have nothing to say.”), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Mills v. United States, 519 
U.S. 1190 (1996). 
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under Davis.197  Professor Weisselberg specifically cites the increase in 
implied waivers as a factor in the decline in the strength of Miranda 
protections.198  More importantly, he concludes that the court system, law 
enforcement interests, and the legislature all stand in the way of “fixing” 
Miranda.199 
Interestingly enough, during a recent question and answer session at the 
University of Denver, a student confronted Justice Sotomayor with a very 
pointed question regarding Thompkins’ impact on Miranda.200  Justice 
Sotomayor explained her dissenting opinion saying, “I dissented on the basis 
that the Court’s prior cases had commanded that a waiver of the right to remain 
silent had to be more explicit.”201  However she followed this up by 
emphatically answering “no,” that the Supreme Court was not eroding 
Miranda protections.202  She articulated those Justices in the majority truly 
believed they were correct in their interpretation of the Court’s precedent and 
the constitutional protections, declining to ascribe those kind of ulterior 
motives to the Justices with whom she did not agree.203  In light of resounding 
accusations that the Thompkins decision has effectively killed Miranda 
protections, it is surprising that Justice Sotomayor would make such an 
impartial statement regarding the future of Miranda. 
The Thompkins decision lacks any thoughtful discussion or consideration 
of how these interrogation pressures affect suspects in practice.  In the sense 
that the majority does not account for these implications, Thompkins is 
contrary to Miranda.204  However, considering Professor Weisselberg’s 
pronouncement that Miranda is “dead” predated the Court’s opinion in 
Thompkins, it is possible Thompkins is just the proverbial nail in the coffin.  
Realistically, the Supreme Court is simply affirming, or at least sanctioning, 
the general digression from Miranda’s strict protections.  But in Miranda, the 
Court itself noted the possibility that these warnings were not the best means of 
protecting a suspect’s constitutional rights, which implicitly sanctions a 
different framework of safeguards.205  It may be incorrect to say that Miranda 
 
 197. Strauss, supra note 69, at 787–802. 
 198. Weisselberg, supra note 176, at 1581–82. 
 199. Id. at 1589–99. 
 200. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Address at the Univ. of Denver Sturm Coll. of Law (Aug. 26, 
2010), available at http://www.c-span.org/flvPop.aspx?src=archive/sc/sc082610_sotomayor1.flv 
&msg=You+are+watching+the+C-SPAN+Networks+LIVE&start=121.287&end=-1. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 39, at 73.  The primary practical implication is the rise 
in implied waivers under extended periods of questioning, like the circumstances in Thompkins.  
Id. at 76. 
 205. 384 U.S. 436, 457 (1966). 
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is dead; the constitutional protections addressed by the Court are very real 
rights given to suspects.  It is the warning system outlined by the Court that is 
now incongruent with those rights.206 
Miranda warnings may be merely symbolic, but this should encourage the 
courts to turn to reform ideas because, regardless of the status of Miranda, 
there must be some viable protections in place for suspects.  One suggestion 
that would ensure accurate accounts of interrogations and encourage honest 
police practice is videotaped confessions.207  Very few jurisdictions require 
videotaped interrogations, but there is evidence that police officials support 
this kind of electronic recording.208  Electronically recorded interrogations 
would provide verifiable proof of the questioning for courts to evaluate, 
however this alone does not remedy the problem at a basic level.  Any 
incriminating statement must be made voluntarily in order to comport with the 
Sixth Amendment; it is not entirely clear that videotaping ensures this.  Courts 
need workable standards for evaluating the voluntariness of the suspect’s 
statement.209  While it is not so obvious that Thompkins represents a serious 
divergence from recent Miranda jurisprudence, so long as the cases favor law 
enforcement, a strong argument can be made that cases such as Thompkins and 
Davis are unfaithful to the constitutional protections supposedly afforded to 
suspects. 
D. Future of Berghuis v. Thompkins 
In the months immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, lower courts have had little time or opportunity to 
apply its precedent in practice.  This section examines the precedential value of 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, concluding lower courts will likely have an easy time 
straightforwardly applying the majority’s unambiguous invocation 
requirement. 
1. Unlikely to be Challenged 
It remains unclear how judges will interpret the opinion, but it is likely the 
decision in Thompkins will have little practical impact because, as suggested 
 
 206. In his response to Professor Weisselberg’s concerns, Professor Bibas argues that 
Miranda’s warnings have always “map[ed] poorly onto the kinds of compulsion that produce 
false confessions and the categories of people likely to confess falsely.”  Weisselberg & Bibas, 
supra note 39, at 77. 
 207. See id. at 80. 
 208. Kassin et al., supra note 191, at 396 (noting only 16% of respondents worked in a 
jurisdiction that required taped interrogations, although 81% reported they favored taping 
interrogations from start to finish). 
 209. Along the same lines, Professor Weisselberg advocates for “judicial oversight through 
richer and more nuanced voluntariness determinations.”  Weisselberg & Bibas, supra note 39, at 
85. 
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earlier, the majority basically affirmed what the lower courts had been doing 
for years—expanding Davis to the right to remain silent, effectively making it 
more difficult for suspects to assert that right.210  It is hard to imagine any 
erroneous or outrageous application of the Thompkins rule that would justify 
this issue ever reaching the Supreme Court again anytime soon, let alone 
overruling it. 
It is important to note that this was a decisive decision, with five Justices 
writing for the majority and four siding with the dissent.211  Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion might have been the better written opinion, 
simply because she was responsive to the majority’s points and defensive of 
her own position.  However, even considering the close split and the drastic 
divergence from Miranda, it is unlikely that this issue will be addressed again 
soon now that the Supreme Court has established a clear standard that is 
straightforward and instructive for lower courts.212 
2. Recent (but Few) Limitations 
The Ninth Circuit surprisingly limited the application of Thompkins in a 
recent opinion, Hurd v. Terhune.213  In that case, the defendant was convicted 
of murdering his wife.214  After the shooting, he was taken into custody, read 
his Miranda rights, and subsequently questioned by police.215  The defendant 
willingly recounted his version of the story, but when asked to reenact how the 
actual shooting occurred, he refused.216  The defendant additionally refused to 
take a polygraph examination.217  The defendant moved to suppress his 
statements, arguing that by refusing to participate in the reenactment or the 
polygraph test, he had invoked his right to remain silent.218  The trial court 
denied his motion, finding his attempted invocations were insufficient to 
effectively invoke his Fifth Amendment protections.219  Thus, the prosecution 
was able to utilize the defendant’s statements and refusals to cooperate as 
 
 210. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 211. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (2010). 
 212. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important 
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”).  The Thompkins decision 
has been applauded as “promot[ing] doctrinal consistency among the prophylactic rights Miranda 
established and show[ing] incredible deference to the need for rules capable of practical 
application by police.”  Fifth Amendment, supra note 95, at 194. 
 213. 619 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 214. Id. at 1082. 
 215. Id. at 1083. 
 216. Id. at 1083–84. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 1084. 
 219. Hurd, 619 F.3d at 1084. 
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evidence of his guilty during trial, and the jury found him guilty of first-degree 
murder.220 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit judges rejected the California appellate 
court’s ruling that the “defendant [had] no right to remain silent selectively.”221  
The court reiterated that during questioning, a suspect may invoke his right to 
remain silent at any time, even after he has waived that right or been 
responsive to questions.222  More pertinently, the court, interpreting 
Thompkins, concluded that where the suspect’s silence or refusal is 
unambiguous, as now required, that may not be used by the prosecution at trial 
to establish that defendant’s guilt, as was the case here.223  The court found, 
disagreeing with the lower California court, the defendant’s responses were 
“objectively unambiguous in context.”224  Because the defendant’s refusals 
were clear and the officers understood those refusals, the court concluded that 
he had successfully invoked his right to remain silent and thus his refusal was 
inappropriately admitted at trial.225 
The court in Hurd clearly believed the defendant’s behavior met the 
“unambiguous” standard.226  However, this is somewhat surprising because 
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompkins, there had been a trend in 
the lower courts to narrowly construe the requirement, finding that invocations 
were unambiguous more often than not.227  It is likely though that Hurd is an 
exception.  Of all the courts that have addressed Berghuis v. Thompkins over 
the past few months, very, very few have distinguished their facts from the 
situation in Thompkins.228  Additionally, Hurd is the only instance where a 
federal court distinguished itself and found that a suspect’s invocation was 
sufficient under the Thompkins standard.229  Because these cases represent such 
a small minority of all the cases that have since addressed Thompkins, it is 
acceptable to consider them exceptions, leaving intact the prediction that most 
courts will straightforwardly and narrowly construe the “unambiguous” 
requirement. 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1086 (quoting People v. Hurd, 62 Cal. App. 4th 1084, 1093 (1998)). 
 222. Id. at 1087. 
 223. Id. at 1088. 
 224. Id. at 1088–89 (noting the defendant refused by saying “I don’t want to,” “No,” and “I 
can’t”). 
 225. Hurd, 619 F.3d at 1088–89. 
 226. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 343 (2012) (finding 
Thompkins did not actually require a verbal invocation, but instead explicit “nonverbal expressive 
conduct” is sufficient to invoke the right to remain silent). 
 227. See cases cited supra note 196. 
 228. State v. Monroe, No. A10-715, 2010 WL 3307087, *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2010); 
People v. Reyes, No. D047521, 2010 WL 3026227, at *13 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2010). 
 229. 619 F.3d at 1088–89. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] BERGHUIS V. THOMPKINS 249 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
It is clear the Supreme Court has significantly strayed from the strong 
language and protection in Miranda with its decision in Berghuis v. 
Thompkins.230  Scholars have been highly critical of the diversion, and 
rightfully so; the unambiguous standard has very real, harsh consequences for 
suspects in custody.  However, courts, including the Supreme Court itself, have 
been digressing from Miranda’s strict safeguards, specifically with respect to 
the waiver requirement, for years, and this process began very quickly after the 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona.  Nearly all lower federal courts imported the 
Davis standard to the right to remain silent prior to the decision in Thompkins.  
Although this expansion has been highly criticized, it paved the way for the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Thompkins.  When taken in this historical context, 
the Court’s pronouncement seems much less significant because it is what the 
lower courts have already been doing for years.  While this may seem like a 
nearly complete divergence from Miranda that renders the Miranda warning 
“you have the right to remain silent” completely ineffective, the majority 
Justices in Miranda indicated the warning system used today is just one 
alternative.231  Rather, resistance to the decision in Thompkins is a likely a 
result of Justice Kennedy’s insufficient explanation of his application of 
Davis—he, like the lower courts, provided no legitimate reasoning in support 
of the Court’s unambiguous requirement.  In contrast to Justice Sotomayor’s 
well written dissent, the majority opinion appeared even less persuasive.  
However, because the Supreme Court simply sanctioned a trend in the lower 
courts, it is unlikely that Thompkins and the right to remain silent will be 




 230. 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010). 
 231. 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). (“[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily required 
adherence to any particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it 
is presently conducted.”). 
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